Wednesday, June 30, 2010

Apple's Smartphone Competition Thins

The competition for turf fought over by iOS, Android, and the smoothly-named Windows Phone 7 has thinned with the apparent death of Microsoft's Kin platform.

After six weeks and under 10k units, we hardly knew ye ;-)

The unit, led by one-time MacBU manager Roz Ho, will be folded into MSFT's other phone OS unit and presumably decisions and coding will slow accordingly. Daring Fireball points out that the people under Roz Ho aren't just bad at making mobile products. However, Microsoft's acquisition of Danger as a strategy to get a high-quality mobile product was doomed from the outset by politics. The "Windows Everywhere" drones made sure that buying Danger for its superior software would go nowhere.

Do iOS and Android have anything to worry about?

Tuesday, June 29, 2010

Fitch on ACAS

Fitch assigned ACAS a post-exchange Issuer Default Rating of B+.

However, the headline on this news was that since ACAS restructured its debt by coercion – that is, by threatening a bankruptcy filing – ACAS was getting a D (okay, "RD", but it reads the same).

Of course ACAS restructured its debt by threatening bankruptcy – otherwise, why would creditors have voluntarily ceased taking default-rate interest from ACAS? This coercive restructuring is why Fitch slaps ACAS' hand: ACAS didn't just pay up according to the schedule in the original debt agreements, but forced its creditors to renegotiate. This could bother you if you were looking to lend to ACAS, but the lowered cost of funds and decreased risk of the overhead of a bankruptcy filing is what equity investors are interested to see.

Fitch's comments about ACAS' potential difficulties raising funds are out of synch with the real world. ACAS has had no trouble raising cash for its managed funds. While ACAS trades 35% below NAV, there's no reason for management to be excited about diluting their own interest by issuing shares, but ACAS hasn't had trouble issuing shares when manageemnt thought it made sense (e.g., the accretive ECAS stock swap and the April issuance to Paulson). So long as ACAS' NOI recovers with the decreased interest rate and the decreased principal (paying interest on the $1b+ in cash it had on the books was making my eyes roll something awful), investors should see interest coverage improve, and with improved interest coverage comes assurance that ACAS will be able to pursue its business as usual while the portfolio has time to recover. Parts of the portfolio were entered specifically to take advantage of economic downturns, and other parts of the portfolio will be in a position to improve as the broader economy improves. These things take time, and improved NOI following improved costs of funds will make time easier to handle.

The headline – ACAS Gets A "D" From Fitch – obscures the substance of ACAS' situation following the debt exchange rather than illuminating it. Its authors get an "F".

For shareholders, the question is whether ACAS has improved its situation, and the "Ratings outlook: Stable" and the "B+" seem to be where their answer lies.

Monday, June 28, 2010

ACAS Debt Exchange Presentation Posted

Investors can hear ACAS' presentation on the completed debt exchange, and download slides to follow along.

The upshot? ACAS paid in cash all the creditors who wanted to be paid cash and refinanced its outstanding debt with new fixed-rate debt ($1.03B at 8.96%, declining to 7.96% when principal falls below $1B) and floating debt ($281M at LIBOR+650bps, reducing to LIBOR+550bps when outstanding debt fallw below $1B; LIBOR subject to 2% floor). ACAS paid creditors a 2% closing fee on the new $1.3B debt, which is secured debt; a 1% fee will also be due on ACAS' outstanding balances on December 30 2011 and December 31 2012. $528M of the new debt is non-amortizing, and $779M is subject to a repayment schedule. The repayment schedule has two tiers: the amount ACAS must pay, and the amount ACAS must pay to avoid increased interest. The chunks aren't trivially small, but next to the cash ACAS has shown it can accumulate through exits, it's not frightening – especially the minimum amortization schedule, which calls for a payment at the end of December 2012 and one in the middle of 2013. The low-interest schedule doesn't have any principal payment until December of next year, and it's less than $71M.

ACAS will be making debt payments as it operates: the secured debt agreements require ACAS to pay creditors a share of "excess" cash flow and asset dispositions above a threshold (above $580M, "excess" exits will be directed toward debt repayment at 50% until debt falls below $422M, then 25%). New equity raises aren't subject to paydowns at all for two years, but any new debt raising must be used to repay existing creditors. In other words, ACAS can refinance the secured debt but can't add to the secured debt until it's repaid its original creditors. This suggests that ACAS won't be raising its cheaper next round of debt from its existing creditors, or they'd be bidding against themselves to lower ACAS' interest rate. Apparently, the definition of "excess" and the application of the repayment threshold means that (according to slide 5) ACAS can raise $1.16B from exits of pledged assets and apply the funds for new investments or general corporate purposes.

ACAS' debt:equity ratio is 1:1 following the debt repayment, and ACAS has $11m in unsecured debt not exchanged in the transaction. ACAS' debt covenant breaches are now gone, and the ovehanging bankruptcy risk has been alleviated. Since ACAS has enjoyed $425M in net portfolio appreciation since the GDP turned positive in Q3 2009 and ACAS has enjoyed a 22% annualized ROE from that point through March 31, 2010, it seems that if the economy continues with positive GDP, ACAS will be in a great position to realize benefits through its diverse portfolio of equity investments.

As previously alluded to, the arcana of predicting the financial impact on ACAS of eliminating its debt covenant breach and lowering ACAS' cost of funds from the double-digit default rates it was paying before the exchange and reducing the principal of that debt by $1B seems sufficiently complex (there are lots of things impacting the shares other than these two factors) that we're condemned to wait for the next couple of quarterly reports to see the specific impact of (a) eliminating the debt covenant breach is on ACAS' NAV discount (which we learn after this quarter's results announcement) and (b) improving ACAS' NOI through improved debt spreads (which we begin to see in the announcement for the upcoming quarter's results).

Assuming the near-term play in ACAS had to do with fixing both of these conditions, it looks like we're going to be waiting about five months to get both the close of both quarters and ACAS' annoncement of those quarters' results. Assuming the economy doesn't go off a cliff (don't say "how much worse can it get?" -- you'll jinx it!), ACAS' performance over that period may give investors further reason to hold.

Looking forward to the news!

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

ACAS: Exchange A Done Deal

ACAS announced this morning that its creditors' votes now exceed the threshold for adopting the out-of-court exchange contemplated by the amended exchange offer.

The bankruptcy-related panic is all over but the shooting: some closing conditions are to be satisfied during a new deadline extension, and the deal deadline has been extended to 5PM on June 25 for that purpose.

The upside and downside? ACAS surely spent a fortune preparing for a bankruptcy that has become unnecessary. Had ACAS not prepared for the bankruptcy, however, it would not have had the hammer with which to compel creditors' participation in the out-of-court exchange. Still, this will weigh on ACAS as an expense over the quarter. The upside is that when ACAS reports its results for the quarter, the NAV it reports will be taken more seriously by people who previously feared bankruptcy would somehow cause that equity to go up in smoke. The result: going forward, the panic over ACAS' performance will be replaced with a more sober consideration of its actual investment performance. With the elimination of default-rate debt interest, ACAS' spread (and thus NOI) should enjoy immediate improvement going forward. This won't be immediately apparent in the results of this quarter – which was consumed under the old debt agreements – but will show up in the second quarter ACAS reports following the close of the exchange deal.

Now for more interesting questions: what will ACAS do with all that cash? (which exceeds its repayment requirements, particularly after some creditors have the right to exchange debt without early repayment) I'm hoping that the crazy economy provides some excellent investment entry opportunities to provide rocking returns for the next decade.

Thursday, June 17, 2010

Creditors Loving ACAS

ACAS posted an announcement that it amended its debt exchange offer. The news is interesting, to say the least.

ACAS had trouble getting bond holders on board with its previous a debt exchange that would make ACAS' unsecured creditors into secured creditors, in exchange for waiving the net asset covenants in ACAS' original debt agreements.

Stifel said ACAS was going to cough up more dough in the form of "make whole" payments to get the bond holders on board, and the stock rallied a little.

The real story is a bit more subtle. There are many claims, each different, by different creditors: lines of credit payable without penalty at will, debt-swap agreements whose parties have speculative future potential rights to payments, and bond holders with a right to fixed payments over a specific time period and the right to keep getting paid through a stated maturity date. As reported by ACAS previously, the folks who can be repaid at will without penalty were 100% on board with ACAS' proposed plan, and so were those with contingent future payment rights. However, the bond holders -- the creditors with protection against early repayment -- had single-digit approval (~6%) now being offered (a) the right not to get paid immediately on approval of the restructuring deal, and (b) continued call protection for the future. And they are now signing onto the restructuring plan: public note holders' approval has jumped from 43% to 72%. Essentially, this suggests that the holdout creditors' main problem with the restructuring plan was the risk they might stop being ACAS creditors. In other words, the problem isn't lack of faith in ACAS but ire at being deprived of their stake in ACAS.

If this isn't a bullish indication of creditor sentiment in favor of ACAS, I don't know what is.

Friday, June 11, 2010

HP Service: An Oxymoron

When HP emailed me to survey me about my recent email support contact, I wrote this in the little box in the web form:

Email "support" demanded I re-do everything I explained I'd done in my original support contact message, including all the testing tips on the tech support site, which the idiot just cut and pasted into his email without apparently reading anything I wrote. Then, he was unable to resolve problem; when he realized this, the promised call to arrange item replacement never came. HP products suck, HP doesn't stand behind its products, and HP lies about how it will try to make things right.

I think this about sums it up. I have a 1990s-era HP LaserJet 6P that works like a champ. Somewhere along the way, HP forgot how to make a quality product.

UPDATE: On, June 28, 2010, HP called about the replacement I was promised. (Although the call traced back to a Buford, GA address, the speaker sounded very convincingly like a worker at a foreign call center.) For a fee, HP promised to expedite the replacement, but in HP's defense they aren't charging me to send the HP in (prepaid FedEx label) and doesn't require receipt of the broken unit prior to sending a replacement. (Of course, they wanted my credit card number to hold hostage against my promise to send the broken unit.) Let's see if the new unit works when it arrives ....

Thursday, June 10, 2010

Ameriprise Bank: Not Worth Your Trouble

Years ago, a relative who was trying to take control of her retirement finally expressed willingness to have her state retirement plan's funds rolled into an IRA account she would be able to invest at her discretion. The State was not easy to deal with, but at last we had a rollover check for a six-figure sum (excluding decimals) that was more than anyone in their right mind wanted to lose.

I had her send it to Ameriprise Bank. Ameriprise has a dizzying array of account types – bank accounts, IRA accounts, brokerage accounts, Simple Employee Retirement accounts, who knows what else – and the cover letter spelled out very clearly what account type the check needed to get into, what account number, and the name on the account. It was all quite straightforward. We watched the account for a while, waiting to see the money show up so she could begin buying things she'd become interested in (like Apple, which has done damn well in the last five years).

After a while, we called for an update: when would the check be in?

Amerprise's answer: "What check?"

Ameriprise lost a six-figure check sent by a state retiree from a state retirement fund from which obtaining a subsequent check would be like pulling teeth from an angry tiger. After some lengthy "discussion" about the check (we were told we might have forgotten to send it, etc.), it turned out that the department with the check was not the department that handled IRA accounts at all, and that it was a department that used an entirely different mailing address than the one to which we sent the check. It also had its own phone number. And that department didn't have any accounts with the tax characteristics required by my retiring relative.

Not an auspicious start.

I am here to tell you that in the intervening years, Ameriprise hasn't gotten any more organized. I've had an Ameriprise Bank account since the company was part of American Express. I used the exact same userID to log into the bank account as I did to log into my American Express credit card accounts. I used the same password. American Express still recognizes them. Ameriprise? Ha. Ameriprise has undergone repeated website infrastructure reorganizations – based on the error messages I get from Amerprise's site, all of which involve Microsoft products – and with each, I get new headaches. Features that stop working, features that are re-implemented with new third-party partners, features that are obsoleted ... and when I call for support on any of these I get the same level of service Amerprise has always delivered.

Service at Amerprise works like this:
Amerirpise: I can reset your password for you and you'll be ready to go.
JadedConsumer: Great!
A: Write this down: y-e-j --
JC: Uppercase or lowercase?
A: It doesn't matter. y-e-j-m-3-#. Can you read that back to me? Good. Now log in and it will let you change your password!
JC: Well, stick with me for a minute to see if this works. I've been through something like this before, and it was a bust. Yeah. Like this. Using the window where I normally log in, it doesn't log me in. It just gives me the same window again. No error message, or anything.
A: What web site are you using?
JC: The one I bookmarked when I opened the account.
A: Try w-w-w-dot-amerprise-dot-com.
JC: Okay ... now it's asking me to enter a password ... and now it's giving me an error, saying it doesn't like the password.
A: What password are you using?
JC: The same one I used for years.
A: But you wanted to reset it.
JC: No I didn't. I wanted to log in. You said you could fix my problem by resetting it. And now it won't take the password that it used to take.
A: You need to use a new password.
JC: What's wrong with my old password? I could remember my old password. That way I didn't need to call for resets.
A: If you want to reset your password, you need to use a new password.
JC: I didn't want to reset my password. I said I wanted to log in. You said you could solve the problem with a password reset. I still can't log in.
Next the new password failed with the exact same Error 500 Internal Server Error courtesy of Microsoft Internet Information Server's Active Server Pages technology. Eventually A said I needed to call back the next day and talk to a web support team. I explained that it wasn't me who forgot the pasword, and it wasn't my browser that was generating pages that said "Error 500: Internal Server Error", and that the last time I had this it took days to sort out. I suggested that he pass mu number to the web support team so they could call me when they figured out how to get my account accessible. Alas, A would not. A pretended that the web support team was somehow cloistered away from public access and unable to phone anyone no matter what they learned. I pointed out that he'd just ordered me to contact them by phone, so they clearly had phones. And since the problem was clearly within Ameriprise's control and not mine – I can't generate Ameriprise server errors, for example – it made sense that the web team be alerted to the problem so it could be fixed.

Although A kept insisting that only Web Support could fix the problem and that I had to call Web Support the next day, it still took about 15 minutes to talk him out of the number I was supposed to call to reach Web Support. He preferred to win an argument with me first regarding the necessity of speaking with them at all.

When I called the number the next day, it wasn't Web Support's number. The people there put me through a series of identification-verifying questions that didn't seem irritating as a precondition to transfering me to Web Support, until after they transferred me to Web Support I was made to answer all the exact same questions all over again. I mean, there's only so many hours in the day. A2 told me to log in, and I reminded him that as I'd just explained, my password had been reset the previous day from the one I had used for years. He told me he'd reset it again. "Write this down. It's not case-sensitive ...."

The exact same failure repeated. What kind of computer system was I using, he asked?

A: That Safari browser is not ... they changed some settings with that browser.
JC: Safari is one of the most standards-compliant browsers on the planet. What is wrong with your server configuration that it is having trouble serving Safari the same content it serves anyone else?
A: Don't be so quick to blame our server, they changed some settings in Safari and we're trying to figure out how to handle it. Did you download Firefox?

In Firefox, the login was made to work. However, when I clicked the "bill pay" option, I got this:

We cannot process your request at this time. Please contact customer service at (800) 297-7378.

Instead of risking this new number, I asked A2 what we should do. He put me in touch with the integrated services department, which (he said) handled bill pay. The discussion with A3 didn't go well.
A: How much are you trying to pay?
JC: I have no idea. Just trying to set up a bill payment leads to an error message.

After explaining where I was on their site (the top-level account summary window you get on login) and what caused the error (clicking the button to look at the bill pay options), A3 began to clue in – or so I thought.

"Oh!" she said. "Bill pay is listed as inactive in your account." Bollocks. I'd used it for years, in the past. Just not recently. Some new back-end change, apparently, that blenderized everyone's existing settings. "I'll activate it for you. Close your browser and try again."

I wasn't about to close every window – including the one in which I was writing this – at the suggestion of the recorded message she'd been taught in 1999. So I logged out and back in, and got the same results.
A: You may have to clear your cookies in your browser.
JC: The last guy said that if I used a different browser, then everything would work fine, and it's not. Why don't you tell me exactly what it is you want me to do and I will try to do it.
A: First, open Internet Explorer.
JC: That is going to be a problem.
A: Well, you need to open Internet Explorer to clear your cookies.
JC: I don't have Internet Explorer and have never needed it to access any of your site's online banking features. If you think the solution to this problem is that I begin using a Microsoft product famous for its insecurity and for not working properly, I'll suggest that we need to get someone on the line who actually understands what is wrong here so we can get it fixed.
Eventually, I was put on hold (for about the 10th time) and then informed that the people who run bill pay said that it would take 24h from her re-activation for it to have any chance of working.

"Is there anything else I can do to help you?"
"Well, it doesn't look like it."
"Thank you for calling Ameriprise Bank."

So ... sign up for an account -- today!
(Not!)